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Abstract
This article focuses on the regional requirements for a pacification of Afghanistan. For this
purpose, Afghanistan is analytically "reframed" as part of South Asia. The hypothesis is that
India is the only regional actor that might possess both the incentives and the capabilities to
deal with the negative security externalities emanating from Afghanistan.In South Asia,
material characteristics such as the delineation of the region and its power polarity are
unclear. India's role within the region is even more controversial. By examining India's role
within its security environment, this paper will suggest how this lack of clarity could be
remedied. In light of the disputes between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, India's involvement in the Afghan conflict is probably the most critical test case
for India's leadership potential. The following section elaborates a theoretical framework
based on Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and the concept of regional hegemony
as one form of regional order.
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in the Context of the South Asian 
Security System 
By Melanie Hanif
Introduction
The end of bipolarity disrupted conflict management arrangements on 
global and regional levels. During the "unipolar moment," the conse-
quences of this rupture affected the regional level more seriously because 
the United States and Russia, who had previously assumed the main 
responsibility for the "management" of regional conflicts, were either 
unable or unwilling to become entangled in peripheral disputes.2 This has 
changed since the beginning of the 21st century. The United States is now 
committed to costly missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has, however, 
become obvious that international security today cannot be granted or 
guaranteed by the United States alone. Attempts by international organi-
zations, especially the United Nations (UN), to fill this gap have proved 
disappointing. The search for alternative conflict management mecha-
nisms is under way.3
Since the September 11 attacks, the Afghanistan conflict has taken center 
stage in the discourse on international security. Attempts to manage this 
conflict have mainly been international, led by the US and NATO. The 
neglect of the regional dimension is due not only to the ignorance of poli-
cymakers but also to Afghanistan's peculiar location between three differ-
ent security systems: Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia.4 It is 
not clear whether Afghanistan merely separates these security environ-
ments or whether it is part of one or more of them. This ambiguity, largely 
inherited from colonial times,5 has been the root cause of many problems 
in contemporary Afghanistan. Today even the limited goals for the coun-
try, namely, a crackdown on al-Qaida and the ousting of the Taliban 
regime, seem distant.6
This article focuses on the regional requirements for a pacification of 
Afghanistan. For this purpose, Afghanistan is analytically "reframed" as 
part of South Asia. The hypothesis is that India is the only regional actor 
that might possess both the incentives and the capabilities to deal with the 
negative security externalities emanating from Afghanistan.
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In South Asia, material characteristics such as the delineation of the 
region and its power polarity are unclear. India's role within the region is 
even more controversial. By examining India's role within its security 
environment, this paper will suggest how this lack of clarity could be rem-
edied. In light of the disputes between India and Pakistan and between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, India's involvement in the Afghan conflict is 
probably the most critical test case for India's leadership potential. The 
following section elaborates a theoretical framework based on Regional 
Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and the concept of regional hegemony 
as one form of regional order.
Analytical Framework: Regional Security Complexes 
and Regional Hegemony
A Regional Security Complex (RSC) is a special form of region, defined by 
the notion of security.7 Lake and Morgan define an RSC as:
"a set of states continually affected by one or more security exter-
nalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area. In such a 
complex, the members are so interrelated in terms of their secu-
rity that actions by any member, and significant security-related 
developments inside any member, have a major impact on the 
others."8
Security externalities are costs and benefits that accrue not only to the 
actors that cause them, but also imperil the safety of neighboring states. 
Variations in magnitude, distribution, and number of security externali-
ties mark the "density" of an RSC.9 RSCs differ from one another in terms 
of degree of conflict and security management arrangements.10 These 
arrangements are termed regional order and are treated as dependent 
variables by the RSCT. Possible independent variables are (1) the distri-
bution of power within the RSC, (2) the number and characteristics of 
involved actors, (3) the degree of conflict, (4) their "embedded-ness" in 
the global system, and (5) great-power involvement. It is the combination 
of these variables which leads to the adoption of a certain regional order, 
which, in turn, varies in terms of (1) the level of cooperation and (2) the 
level of legal regulation.
One mode of regional order which has not been discussed systematically 
within RSCT yet, but which is implicit in both the Buzan/Wæver and the 
Lake/Morgan RSCT approaches,11 is the concept of regional hegemony. 
The idea is derived from hegemonic stability theory, which was originally 
developed in the field of political economy.12 As a rather new trend, hege-
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monic stability is also being discussed as a model of regional order.13 The 
key argument is that power asymmetry leads to peace and stability when 
power is exercised in a "benign" manner.14 Thus, it is both the structure 
and the "character" of power which lie at the heart of hegemonic stability:
"Benign unipolarity refers to a hierarchical structure in which a 
preponderant geographic core establishes a hub-spoke pattern of 
influence over a weaker periphery. Like an empire, the core exerts 
a powerful centripetal force over the periphery by virtue of its 
uncontested preponderance and the size and scope of its 
economy. But unlike in classical empire, regional order emerges 
from a consensual bargain between core and periphery, not from 
coercion."15
This "bargain" does not necessarily imply a formal procedure. Rather, it 
evolves from constant interaction between the regional actors. Neverthe-
less, it is crucial to the legitimacy of a hegemon's rule over the region. But 
how can these often informal bargains be captured and analyzed? One 
possibility is to look at them as the outcome of strategic interactions. This 
outcome is shaped by both the actors and the environment in which the 
interaction takes place. From this perspective, local security externalities 
increase regional costs. "It is the desire to reduce these greater social costs 
or capture the larger social benefits that motivates efforts at regional 
cooperation."16 An RSC, then, constitutes the strategic environment cre-
ated by externalities and the incentives to deal with them. The question of 
managing conflict becomes a problem of strategic choice. The outcome—
that is, the mode of conflict management—depends on the preferences, 
perceptions, and relative power of the regional actors involved, while 
their options depend on the preferences of and actions taken by other 
actors.17
An analysis of regional conflict management arrangements thus has to 
take into account the type and severity of regional security externalities, 
the regional incentives, and the capacity for dealing with these.18 Particu-
larly in conflictive regional settings, a hegemon's offer of restraint is 
affected by a lack of credibility. From the perspective adopted in this 
paper, credibility is dependent on the preferences of the actors and uncer-
tainties about other actors' type. It applies both to current promises and 
the question of whether these promises, even if credible today, will be in 
the actor's interest in the future.19 By applying this theoretical framework, 
the following section will analyze India's role in South Asia. For this pur-
pose it will be argued why Afghanistan should be treated as a member for 
the South Asian RSC and why India's interaction with Afghanistan and 
Pakistan is crucial for assessing India's regional leadership potential.
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India's Afghanistan Policy and Its Implications for 
Regional Order in South Asia
The Delineation of the South Asian RSC
Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of the Middle Eastern, Central Asian, 
and South Asian RSCs. In the nineteenth century, it was crafted as a 
buffer zone to separate the then dominant regional powers—Britain, Rus-
sia, and Persia. Today's regional powers in the broader neighborhood 
around Afghanistan—especially Iran, Pakistan, India, and China—are all 
involved in the country's affairs. Iran, for instance, has been significantly 
contributing to the reconstruction of Afghan infrastructure20 and China 
may soon become the largest provider of foreign direct investment in 
Afghanistan.21
This is only to mention a few examples of external powers' activities in the 
country. The rivalries among them often hamper the purpose of stabiliz-
ing Afghanistan.22 Another consequence of ongoing multi-party involve-
ment by neighboring states is that the designation of Afghanistan to one 
region of the world is still inconclusive. Buzan and Wæver, for example, 
describe Afghanistan as an insulator state or a "mini-complex" and not as 
a member of a particular RSC.23 They reason that:
"[F]irst, none of the neighbouring countries is either interested 
in, or capable of, establishing its hegemony over […] Afghanistan. 
[…] Second, all of the neighbouring states have more pressing 
security concerns in other directions."24
Today, Afghanistan is clearly a part of the dominant conflict in South 
Asia.25 Pakistani policymakers have found themselves flanked by two 
neighbors with whom they have been involved in territorial disputes since 
the very emergence of Pakistan.26 Pakistan supported the Taliban govern-
ment in order to relieve pressure stemming from Pashtun nationalism27 
and to gain "strategic depth" vis-à-vis India.28 Conversely, India's support 
for perceptibly anti-Pakistani forces in Afghanistan is interpreted as 
encirclement by Pakistan.29
In sum, Pakistan sees both India and Afghanistan as relevant to its own 
national security and, accordingly, responds to actual and perceived 
threats in its relations with both states.30 Pakistan has time and again 
faced the danger of fragmentation and has accused India and Afghanistan 
of supporting separatist movements in Pakistan.31 The fragmentation of 
Pakistan would, however, send out major shock waves to Afghanistan and 
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Central Asia and not least to India.32 On the other hand, any worsening of 
the security situation in Afghanistan directly spills over to Pakistan by 
encouraging local Taliban. Notwithstanding this, Afghanistan accuses 
Pakistan of supporting the Afghan insurgents in order to maintain control 
over intra-Afghan affairs.33 This indicates that "security externalities are 
far more extensive, compelling, and durable"34 among Afghanistan, Paki-
stan, and India than between them and other countries.
In addition, the cooperative structures in the region, limited as they may 
be, should not be entirely omitted. The inclusion of Afghanistan into 
South Asia appears all the more justified since Afghanistan joined the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2007.35 
The exclusion of Afghanistan from what "naturally" constituted South 
Asia (or, formerly, India) can be traced back to British colonial rule.36 As 
part of the hegemonic discourse, it was aimed at concealing Britain's 
inability to gain control over the territory west of the Indus. After the 
departure of the British from the subcontinent, the US promoted the term 
South Asia, distinguishing it from Southeast Asia.37 The reason for these 
different framings of South Asia is that they fundamentally affect respon-
sibility for engagement.38 In this light, Afghanistan's accession to the 
SAARC and the fact that it was promoted by India39 can be interpreted as 
a sign of India's willingness to engage durably in Afghan security manage-
ment and to integrate Afghanistan into the South Asian regional order.
Turning to the Middle East, Afghanistan is not a party to the dominant 
conflict there, which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Afghanistan is con-
nected to the Middle Eastern RSC mainly through Iran. Iran's role in both 
security environments is indeed important to their delineation. In this 
regard, Buzan's assessment that Iran is much more preoccupied with 
developments in the Middle East, where it seeks a leading role, appears to 
be correct. For Iran, the most pressing security threat emanating from 
Afghanistan is not a local externality (such as Islamic fundamentalism or 
Afghan refugees) but the military presence of the United States. This pres-
ence threatens Iran not so much because of competing interests within 
Afghanistan itself, but rather because of U.S. containment of Iran's lead-
ership aspirations in the Middle East. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
take the Iranian border as the line that separates the Middle Eastern from 
the South Asian RSC.
With a view to Afghanistan's northern neighborhood, Russia's attempt to 
integrate Afghanistan into Central Asia has failed. Although northern 
Afghanistan has close economic, ethnic, and cultural ties with Central 
Asia, in terms of security it is much more affected by South Asia.
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Regional Order in South Asia
Within the South Asian RSC, India is the overwhelmingly dominant actor 
in terms of material capabilities. India accounts for more than 75 percent 
of the region's population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and military 
expenditure.40 The distribution of capabilities within the South Asian 
RSC is thus unipolar. India has nonetheless never managed to transform 
its material lead into the political reality of hegemony. In fact, South 
Asian politics seem to have been driven by a bipolar constellation most of 
the time, with India unable to resolve its conflict with Pakistan. The 
regional order in South Asia has remained a crisis-prone power-
restraining-power model. This highlights the fact that no approach 
related to distribution of power can explain South Asian politics since 
India has not been able to dominate regional affairs according to its 
material superiority, nor has it effectively fostered regional integration 
through the provision of public goods. No clear tendency of joint 
balancing among or "bandwagoning" by the smaller South Asian states 
has been observable so far. In short, most scholars find it puzzling that the 
South Asian RSC is far from exhibiting a stable hegemonic order in spite 
of a unipolar distribution of capabilities.
This can be partly explained by the fact that, despite India's apparent 
superiority, Pakistan is still disproportionately strong compared to the 
remaining South Asian states.41 Therefore, it has been relatively easy for 
India to transform its relations with the smaller South Asian states 
towards hegemony, which has in turn brought about more cooperation to 
this part of South Asia. India had little to fear when it announced the prin-
ciple of non-reciprocity with these countries. But although the gap in 
material capabilities between India and Pakistan is considerable, India 
still does not feel comfortable including Pakistan in its doctrine of unilat-
eral concessions.42 The nuclearization of the subcontinent has reinforced 
Pakistan's claim as a challenger of India. This could explain why
"South Asia comprises of two distinct "theatres" of conflict: 
between India and Pakistan, on the one hand, and between India 
and its smaller neighbors, on the other. The first is a theatre of 
war where military hostilities are always a distinct possibility; the 
other is a theatre of less militarised conflict in which hostilities 
are virtually ruled out."43
From this point of view it becomes clear that the South Asian RSC does 
not revolve around the India-Pakistan rivalry, as is often portrayed, but 
around the dominant position of India, which has dominated all smaller 
neighbors in the first place.
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The states in the eastern theater (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, 
Sikkim, and the Maldives) were too weak to resist Indian superiority and 
India was confident in resorting to a "benign" strategy. These develop-
ments were consolidated by the restraint of outsiders who acknowledged 
India's dominant role in this area. Thus, the United States countenanced 
India's interventions in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal.44 As pre-
dicted by RSCT, this unipolar sub-order functioned relatively autono-
mously and headed towards stability.45 In the western theater, however, 
quite the contrary was the case. During the Cold War, the bipolar logic 
within this sub-order was sustained through great-power involvement, 
that is, the United States and China on the Pakistani side and the Soviet 
Union on the Indian side. Given this backdrop of a bipolar international 
system interacting with a quasi-bipolar regional system, it is not surpris-
ing that attempts at conflict management in western South Asia have 
been sparse and ineffective.46
Up to today, violent conflict has prevailed in the western theater; the den-
sity of the complex could hardly be higher. On the other hand, incentives 
for managing conflict are also inherent in these sources of crises. The 
boom of the Indian economy throughout the last decade has raised the 
hope that India could now extend its ordering model to its western neigh-
borhood. The next section will explicate the conditions under which India 
might possibly become a "benign hegemon" in the entire South Asian 
RSC, including Pakistan and Afghanistan.
India as a Benign Regional Hegemon in South Asia
India's incentives to engage in Afghan conflict management are obvious: 
inaction is felt in the difficulty to access the Central Asian economies and 
energy reserves or in the constant infiltration of militant Islamists to 
Kashmir. The geographic proximity makes the projection of force to 
Afghanistan easier for India than for remote powers. With Pakistan's 
refusal to grant India overland access to Afghanistan,47 however, this 
advantage on India's part is rendered less significant. The decisive issues 
determining India's future role in Afghanistan are in fact (1) whether 
India possesses the capabilities for long-term engagement in Afghan 
security (2) whether its engagement will be accepted as legitimate by 
Afghans and other stakeholders in Afghan stability; and (3) whether 
Indian policymakers will be able to justify their engagement vis-à-vis their 
domestic constituencies.48
Addressing the question of its resources and resolve, India is the largest 
non-OECD donor to Afghanistan.49 It provides scholarships for Afghan 
students and fosters commercial ties with the country. India has also 
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offered training to the Afghan National Security Forces, but this has not 
been realized due to Pakistani opposition.50 Nevertheless, India has sent 
about four thousand Indian workers to Afghanistan.51 It is committed to 
infrastructure projects, especially the reconstruction of overland roads. In 
terms of soft power, India's asset is the popularity of Indian music, mov-
ies, and television shows in Afghanistan.52 With a view to military capa-
bilities, India has enhanced its presence in Central Asia through the 
establishment of its first airbase outside India in Tajikistan.53 All this 
points to India's willingness to become more deeply involved in stabiliz-
ing Afghanistan. Nevertheless, India as the main provider of security in its 
troubled neighborhood can only be a long-term prospect. Even if this sce-
nario was desirable for India and its neighbors, the burden of granting 
security would still fall on the United States and NATO for quite a long 
time, while India is expanding its capabilities and its commitment to 
Afghanistan.
Concerning external acceptance, the United States is likely to welcome 
increased Indian engagement as long as this does not endanger Pakistan's 
cooperation. This potential acceptance is largely due to a transformation 
in the relationship between the United States and India towards a strate-
gic partnership since the end of the Cold War.54 Russian-Indian ties have 
always been friendly, with India being an important client for Russian 
military exports. As long as India does not advance its military presence 
deeper into the Russian sphere of influence, Russia is likely to prefer an 
India-dominated regional order that stretches through Afghanistan over a 
U.S. presence in the region.55 The same applies to Iran, with whom India 
has enjoyed increasingly cooperative relations since the end of the Cold 
War.56
Although most of the external parties are likely to accept a prominent role 
of India in Afghanistan, two important veto players remain: Pakistan and 
China. Since the late 1950s, India-China relations have been marked by 
rivalry and at times overt hostility. Today, both countries seem to handle 
their relationship pragmatically, giving priority to economic growth.57 
Due to their status as emerging non-Western economies, both countries 
have common interests vis-à-vis established powers. Nevertheless, China 
remains suspicious about the Indo-US partnership and fears encircle-
ment,58 just as India fears encirclement by a hostile China-Pakistan 
entente. Furthermore, whereas Chinese and Indian claims along the bor-
der, in Southeast Asia, Tibet, and Kashmir are set, Central Asia is a new 
playground where both states are competing for natural resources. 
Against this backdrop it appears doubtful that China will consent to an 
extension of Indian influence to the outskirts of Central Asia. On the other 
hand, the alternatives—an enduring US presence, an abandoned Afghani-
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stan drifting into chaos, or China itself as a provider of security to Afghan-
istan—seem similarly undesirable from a Chinese perspective.
India has little to offer to influence the Chinese position. China's reluc-
tance would make it more difficult for India to establish hegemonic order 
over Afghanistan, but it would not make it impossible. Pakistan, on the 
other hand, could doom India's efforts to failure. Vis-à-vis Pakistan, how-
ever, India has more options for inducing cooperation. The liberalization 
of the Indian economy and its subsequent boom have increased both the 
possibilities and the benefits of regional economic cooperation. But a 
mere consolidation of India's material lead will not suffice. Hegemonic 
stability requires both a certain structure and a certain character of 
power: "The core agrees to engage in self-binding, and in return the 
periphery bandwagons and agrees to enter into the core's sphere of influ-
ence."59 Indian policymakers may be convinced that they already have 
been acting with self-restraint vis-à-vis Pakistan. To them it will be obvi-
ous that India only seeks its due position in a secure and stable South 
Asia. Khosla, in a publication of the Indian Foreign Service Institute, for 
instance, expressed it this way:
"Because of its size India can afford […] non-reciprocity in rela-
tions with the smaller neighbours. […] [G]estures that are being 
made to Pakistan on issues such as their claim on the Indian state 
of Jammu and Kashmir, are steps that fall in this category; they 
[…] promote the regional spirit."60
The problem in this respect is India's credibility in the eyes of Pakistan. At 
the heart of this problem lies Pakistan's trauma of disintegration suffered 
in 1971. While India may believe that it has acted with restraint in prior 
crises with Pakistan, for example in the 1999 Kargil crisis, from the Paki-
stani perspective India's assistance in the creation of Bangladesh over-
shadows all other Indian actions.61 For India, the intervention in the 1971 
East Pakistan crisis was legitimized by West Pakistan's bad governance in 
the east and the resulting negative security externalities affecting India. 
India's limited motivations have, from an Indian perspective, been dem-
onstrated by the non-integration of East Bengal into the Indian Union 
and the sparing of West Pakistan. For Pakistan, however, the events of 
1971 were the proof that India ultimately seeks to dismember Pakistan.62
Conclusion
In summary, the analysis has shown the high degree of security interde-
pendence which exists in the western theater of South Asia, that is, 
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between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It has furthermore detected 
strong indications of India's willingness to expand its responsibility in 
this area, especially through contributions to stabilizing Afghanistan. 
These intentions could fill an existing gap since other regional and global 
actors have so far not been able or willing to consolidate security manage-
ment arrangements in western South Asia. On the other hand, it has 
become clear that the establishment of regional order is hampered by 
Pakistan's opposition to Indian domination. It has been argued that Paki-
stan can only accept an India-centered order if its own security—vis-à-vis 
neighbors, external powers, and most importantly India itself—is granted. 
This requires a credible demonstration of Indian self-restraint as well as 
mechanisms to ensure India's commitment to this principle in the long 
term.
"As the security issue is vital for Pakistan, it cannot afford misjudgments 
of Indian motivations. To change the situation it is necessary to 
strengthen Pakistan's sovereignty. Therefore the border issues between 
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan need to be resolved. India, as the stron-
gest and most consolidated of the three states, would have the best 
chances of making unilateral concessions, for example, regarding the 
Siachen Glacier. The extension of the principle of non-reciprocity to Paki-
stan would be domestically costly for any Indian politician. But according 
to the logic of signaling, it is these costs that make a signal credible."63
Given this, it appears doubtful that India aspires to a leading role in South 
Asia. What would be the benefits? The most convincing answer to this 
question refers to two preferences in India's grand strategy: India wants 
to (1) exclude external powers from its immediate neighborhood64 and (2) 
be recognized as a global major power.65 If these assertions are correct, 
India will not be able to avoid taking on responsibility for security in its 
sphere of influence. Whether they are correct and how they relate to one 
another should be the subject of further investigation.
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